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ESSAY I
Hateful Speech, Loving Communities:
Why Our Notion of "A Just Balance"

Changes So Slowly
Richard Delgadot Jean Stefancict
INTRODUCTION

The debate about hate speech features two camps, each of which sees
the world quite differently.' One group, on learning that some campus
administrators are considering enacting hate speech rules, immediately
declares the proposal a free speech question. If one places speech at the
center, a number of things immediately follow. The hate speech rule advoCopyright 0 1994 California Law Review, Inc.
t Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974, University of
California, Berkeley.
t Research Associate, University of Colorado School of Law.
We are grateful to Bonnie Grover, Alenka Han, Kelly Robinson and Frank Sledge for research
assistance, and to the University of Colorado Law School dean's fund for material support in preparing
this Article. We presented portions of this Article at workshops at Grinnell College Department of
Political Science, University of Chicago Law School and St. Thomas University School of Law; we
gratefully acknowledge the contributions and suggestions of these communities.
1. On the role of perspective in addressing racial harms, see, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. Rav. 561, 568-69 (1984);
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills? 77 CORNL.L L. REv. 1258, 1282-84 (1992) [hereinafter
Delgado & Stefancic, Images] (recognizing that one may choose not to "see" racism when one is not
subjected to it); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious
Moral Error?, 69 Tax. L. Rav. 1929, 1930 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and
Narratives] (criticizing judges' inability to understand the experiences of others); Charles Lawrence, If
He Hollers Let Him Go: RegulatingRacist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 434-35 (explaining
operation of perspective and experience in the hate speech debate); Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 2320, 2335 (1989) (advocating narrow
hate speech exception to First Amendment). For other articles on perspectives that generally support the
desirability of hate speech regulation, see Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARv. L. REV.
1872 (1990); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words That Wound].
On the two paradigms, or ways of characterizing the campus hate speech controversy, see Richard
Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. Rav. 343,
345-48 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Narratives];John Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of
Speech and Equality, in Ti PaIcE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST PORNOGRAPHY AND HATE SPEECH (L.
Lederer & Richard Delgado, eds., forthcoming 1995) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Powell,
Reconciling].
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cates are placed on the offensive, seen as aggressors attempting to curtail a
precious liberty. The burden shifts to them to show that the speech restriction is not content-based, is supported by a compelling interest, is the least
restrictive means of promoting that interest, and so on.2

Concerns about slippery slopes and dangerous administrators also arise
when the hate speech controversy is viewed through a free-speech lens: if
we allow face-to-face racial invective to be bridled, will we not soon find

ourselves tolerating restrictions on classroom speech or political satire in
the school newspaper?3 If we permit our fragile web of speech protection
to suffer one rent, might not others soon follow? Moreover, someone will
have to adjudicate complaints brought under the new rules. Is there not a
danger that the judge or administrator will turn into a narrow-minded cen-

sor, imposing his or her notion of political orthodoxy on a campus climate
that ought to be as free as possible?'
Hate speech rule advocates, however, will see the controversy in different terms. For them, the relevant issue is whether campuses are free to
impose reasonable rules to protect the dignity and self-regard of vulnerable
young African American undergraduates and other targets of hate speech.5
These advocates place equality at the center of the controversy and portray
the defenders of racist invective as seeking to attack values emanating from
the equality-protecting Constitutional amendments. 6 Since these values are

vital to our system of justice, rule advocates maintain that it is incumbent
on free speech advocates to show that the hate-speaker's interest in hurling
racial invective rises to the requisite level of compellingness. They will
2. On judicial review of state actions encroaching on the right of free speech, see Lewis v. City
of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 131-32 (1974) (striking down state prohibition of "opprobrious
language" as overbroad); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (requiring libelled
public officials to prove "actual malice"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433-37 (1963) (holding a
legal malpractice statute which interfered with NAACP's organizing activities fatally vague and
overbroad).
Examples of the sort of categorical thinking we describe are legion. Compare R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) and Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(characterizing cases before them almost exclusively as first amendment problems) with Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (characterizing cases
almost solely in protection-of-equality terms, even though they also contained regulatory and liberty
components weighing in the other direction). All four of these cases contained both liberty and equality
elements, and could have been characterized either way. By choosing the paradigm, the Court chose the
outcome.
3. See, e.g., Robert M. O'Neil, Colleges Should Seek Educational Alternatives to Rules that
Override the Historic Guarantees of Free Speech, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 18, 1989, at BI, B3;
Garry Wills, In Praiseof Censure, TimE, July 31, 1989, at 71-72.
4. For commentators who fear inroads into First Amendment doctrine will lead to censorship,
see, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrEn STATES 223-25 (1942) [hereinafter
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH]; George Will, Academic Liberals' Brand of Censorship, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7,
1989, at A22.
5. On the harms of hate speech, see Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note I, at 140-41.
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII (forbidding slavery); U.S. CorsT. amend. XIV (providing for equal
protection of the laws); U.S. CONsT. amend. XV (protecting right to vote). For an earlier discussion of
this "equality paradigm," see Delgado, Narratives, supra note 1, at 381-83.
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insist that this interest be advanced in the way least damaging to equality,

and they, too, will raise line-drawing and slippery slope concerns, but from
the opposite direction. If society does not intervene to protect equality from

this intrusion, where will it all stop?7 Rule advocates will raise concerns
about the administrator who will make decisions under the code, but again
from the opposite direction: they will want to make sure that the hearing
officer is sensitive to the delicate nuances of racial supremacy in the incidents likely to come before him or her.'
Differences between the two camps run deeper than matters of doctrine
and administrability, however. The two sides invoke different narratives to
rally support and make their view of the matter seem the only reasonable
one.9 The free speech defenders depict the current struggle as just the latest
in a long succession of battles to keep speech free. They evoke a long,
deeply stirring account including early struggles against censorship by king

and church. 10 They see a history of book-burning, inquisitions, official
blacklists, and imposed orthodoxy."1 They cite heroes-Galileo, Voltaire,
Locke-who in word or deed resisted imposed orthodoxy or ignorance.12
The story the speech defenders tell is deeply rooted in the myths, history,
and traditions of our people.
The minority defenders have their own narrative, however, one which
taps cultural myths no less rooted, no less stirring than those invoked by the
7. See Delgado, Narratives, supra note 1, at 349-58 (describing recent campus incidents,
including slave auctions, racist graffiti, and one campus fraternity's erection of a 15-foot high caricature
of a black man with a bone through his nose).
8. The First Amendment paradigm includes suspicion of self-aggrandizing and illegitimate
arrogation of power by a regulator of some sort. See CuAFEE, FREE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 218-32,
314, 497-501. The defenders of minority rights fear the opposite-a deficiency of zeal or expertise in
the arbiters of social equality.
9. Recent writing emphasizes the way in which internalized stories or "narratives" help us
construct and order reality, including law's version of it. See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966); JAMEs B. WHIrr, HERAcLEs' Bow:
ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 174-75 (1985); Paul Ricoeur, Narrative Time, in
ON NARRATIVE 165-86 (WJ.T. Mitchell ed., 1980) (on the use of narratives in discourse and
construction of reality); Symposium: Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (a collection of
articles on the way storytelling functions in legal discourse to guide thought and determine judicial
outcomes).
For a recent effort to reconcile the tension between the two paradigms present in the hate speech
controversy, see Powell, Reconciling, supra note 1, at 46-52. Powell believes this tension is undesirable
and should be treated by finding a third value (namely participation) and then persuading both sides to
accept that as primary. Unfortunately, this effort is doomed to fail because both sides will say, "It is
precisely because participation is so important that society must ... (reject; put in place) hate speech
rules." The pre-existing narrative or mindset retains its efficacy and will be used to situate and limit the
proposed new approach. See infra notes 48-80.
10. See generally CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH, supra note 4.
11. See, e.g., id. at 497-50 1; LmERTY OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON (L. Levy ed.,
1966).
12. See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 497-501; Richard Delgado & David R. Millen,
God, Galileo and Government: Toward Constitutional Protectionfor Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L.
Rav. 349, 354-56 (1978); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 583 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (praising the Framers for redefining common-law treason to require an overt act).

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:851

free speech defenders. For hate speech rule advocates, the struggle over
hate speech is a continuation of our nation's centuries-long battle over
equality and brotherhood."3 They read a history that includes early abolitionists who worked to subvert an evil institution-Quakers and others who
operated the underground railroad-and 1960s-era civil rights protesters
who put their bodies on the line for racial justice. They, too, have their
heroes: Frederick Douglass, Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Justice Harlan, author of the dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.14
Each side of the controversy thus wants not merely to have the balance
struck in its favor, but also to place its interpretation of what is at stake at
the center of the characterization. Yet, on closer inspection it turns out that
the two stories are closely connected: although on the surface contradictory
and in tension, the paradigms stand in an intricate relation. Like lovers
locked in a death embrace, each depends on, yet threatens, the other. Part I
of this Essay describes this interconnection and its source using the notion
of an interpretive community.
When confronted with competing values, a common response in our
system of politics is to entrust the decision to a wise judge who will balance
the concerns at stake.' The peculiar relation of speech and equality, however, casts doubt on the feasibility of a balancing solution. Part II illustrates
the shortcomings of balancing through historical examples. Part III
employs narrative theory to explain the source of the difficulty and
describes some mechanisms society deploys to assure that canonical ideas
and social structures do not change too rapidly. The Essay concludes by
discussing means by which reformers hoping to change the current system
may make some modest inroads.
I
How SPEECH

EQUALITY BOTH PRESUPPOSE AND
THREATEN EACH OTHER

AND

Free speech and equality presuppose and threaten each other. Insult
and invective, brought to bear by a powerful majority on a helpless minor13. See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter
BELL, RACE, RACISM]; VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN
AMERICA (1981).
14. For histories of these movements and heroes, see, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 55264 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); HARDING, supra note 13; JUAN WILLIAMS, EYEs ON THE PRIZE:
AMERICA'S CIVIL RIorrrs YEARS, 1954-1965 (1987).
A few commentators have attempted to identify the fundamental values underlying our system of
free expression, on the one hand, and the equality-protecting amendments on the other. For a discussion
of the bearing of First Amendment theory and Fourteenth Amendment rationales on the controversy
over hate speech, see Delgado, Narratives,supra note 1, at 375-83.
15. On the ubiquitous balancing approach deployed in various areas of constitutional law, see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsMrTIONAL LAW 457, 789-94, 944-45, 977-87, 1037-39, 1251-55

(2d ed. 1988).

1994]

HATEFUL SPEECH, LOVING COMMUNITIES

ity, can oppress.16 It can harm directly, either through injury to the psyches
of its victims or by encouraging others to take immediate hostile action.17
It can also harm indirectly, constructing an image or stigma-picture according to which the victim is less than human. 8 For these reasons, many
minorities ask for protection from hate speech in the form of speech codes.
But the call for respectful treatment itself can stifle and oppress.1 9
Imagine, for example, a community that enacted a rule prohibiting all
expression that any individual in the group might find unsettling. This call
for civility could conceivably lead to a bland form of group-think in which
little change could occur.2 0 Speech and equality are thus in tension.
Yet, speech and communitarian values also depend on each other. As
the ACLU's Nadine Strossen points out, speech has served as a powerful
instrument for social reform, 21 something minorities (if they knew their
own history) ought to know as well as anyone. But her counterparts point
out with equal logic that speech, at least in the grand dialogic sense, presupposes rough equality among the speakers.22 Speech among persons who are
markedly unequal in power and standing is not democratic dialogue at all,
but something else-a sermon, a rant, an order, a summons-like speech to
a child.2 3
Speech and community are thus simultaneously interdependent and in
tension; the current debate itself is evidence of this complexity. Despite the
difficulty in dealing with conflict between values central to our society,
however, practical challenges force us to act. Minorities clamor for greater
protection from campus insults, hate crimes, and symbolic acts such as
cross-burning.2 4 The ACLU and other liberal organizations demand that
campuses refrain from enacting broad hate speech regulations, on the
16. On the ability of concerted speech to harm, see Delgado, Narratives,supra note 1, at 383-85;
see also Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 1, at 143-49. On the role of derogatory or stereotyped
ethnic imagery in maintaining current power relations, see Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1,
at 1279.
17. Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 1, at 143-49.
18. See, e.g, Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1276.
19. Stephen G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. R~v. 801,
888-89 (1993) (criticizing search for community values as inherently favoring status quo); Martin H.
Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional
Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CALw. L. REv. 267, 294-97 (1991) (warning that deference to
community values leads to censorship).
20. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 19, at 858-64 (pointing out that community values are normally
determined by the majority).
21. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Hate Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE LJ.
484, 567-68 [hereinafter Strossen, Regulating].
22. Lawrence, supra note 1, at 437.
23. See id. at 452-54 (explaining that historical association of racial epithets with violence against
minorities often renders listener powerless to respond). One also recalls those parents who pretend to be
"democratic" with their children: "Johnny, it's time we discussed your room."
24. Delgado, Narratives,supra note 1, at 349-58 (detailing incidents at various campuses and the
institutional responses).
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ground that speech must remain as free as possible.25 To make matters
worse, the situation is often binary. If minorities demand a speech code, we
can either oblige them or not. If the ACLU challenges a speech code, we

can strike it down, or not.
The usual approach in our system of politics whenever principles clash
is to try to balance the competing values in some fashion.2 6 We hope that
an ingenious decisionmaker can find a way to protect minorities from
invective and insult while allowing speakers some liberty to say what is on
their minds.
But the difficulty is not just the practical one of finding the right compromise. Speech and equality are not separate values, but rather opposite

sides of the same coin. Their interdependence arises because they are integral aspects of a more basic phenomenon, namely the interpretive community." Recent scholarship points out that communication requires a group
of persons who agree to see the world roughly in the same way. It presupposes a community of speakers and listeners who abide by certain conventions, who assign particular meanings and interpretations to words and

messages.28 Without such an interpretive community, communication is
impossible.
This notion of an interpretive community explains the precarious interdependence of speech and equal-protection values. Speech requires com-

munity 29-without it communication is virually impossible. At the same
time, community requires speech because it is our only way of doing what

communities must do.30 Yet, concerted speech can isolate or exclude a
weak minority, 31 and majoritarian limitations on what can be said can
freeze social change.32 It is this precarious interdependence that makes the
hope of balancing the interests of the two sides in the hate speech controversy problematic. In effect, a judge weighing any non-trivial proposal for
25. See, e.g., Strossen, Regulating, supra note 21 (urging that racism on campus be countered by
measures consistent with a broad interpretation of the First Amendment).
26. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. On the difficulty of communication and dialogue
when the subject of discussion concerns strongly held values rooted in radically different world views,
see At.ASDAIR MAcIhR, AFTER ViRTUE 6-10 (2d ed. 1984).
27. For a lucid exposition of this concept, see generally STANLEY FisH, Is THERE A TEx'T INTnis
CLASS? 14 (1980); see also infra notes 48-69 and accompanying text (explaining the concept's relation
to the hate speech controversy).
28. On the way in which the current communicative paradigm contains and facilitates racism, see
Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1275-84.
29. "Community" in this context is an interpretive community, a community of meaning, within
which intelligible expression is possible.
30. Speech is the only way we can relate to others in any complex fashion. We also need it to
make the basic arrangements that enable social life to occur, such as choosing a leader, selecting a form
of government, and deciding whose choices count.
31. A portion of a community with the power to do so can construct a disparaging image of a
smaller, weaker group, effectively excluding them from the community. See supra note 16-18.
32. A group that enacted rules against self-criticism would resist evolution and orderly change.
On this dialectic function of speech, see generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
ExPREssIoN (1970).
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regulating hate speech is deciding whether to throw the state's weight

behind a new interpretive community. 33 That new speech-community will
have different bounds from the old. In it, African Americans, or gays, or

women will be included, treated with greater respect, or less. Their image,
their self-regard, will be treated with greater solicitude, or less. Their
speech will be given greater credibility, or less. Terms and customs dear to
them will be included in the lexicon, or not.3 4
When judges make decisions with respect to speech codes, they are not
simply balancing two discrete things, like Smith's desire to have a twelvefoot fence against Jones' desire to have more sunlight in his living room.
They are deciding between competing conceptions of speech-equality, and
therefore between different worlds we might live in. This is a more
portentous and difficult task than deciding whether the interest of a young
black undergraduate in not being called a "N. . ." late at night on his or her

way home from the library "outweighs" the interest of the would-be speaker
in shouting it.
Can judges properly carry out this task? Not easily. As we explain in
greater detail in Part III, deciding between one speech-community and
another requires a dialogue.35 Judges will have discussions with other

judges or carry on internal monologues with themselves, all conducted
through a set of conventions using words with established meanings.3 6
These dialogues-about-dialogue will be heavily weighted in favor of the
current regime.3 7 Thus, most radical reformers and members of movements
which aim to transform the speech-community do not believe that judges
can fairly balance the two competing values-one established and
entrenched, the other foreign and "new." For judges to weigh proposed
speech regulations fairly and dispassionately requires them, in effect, to
33. That is, he or she is calibrating the two parts of the speech-community dyad so as to produce,
in effect, a new dyad or interpretive community.
34. But cf. Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1275-88 (implying that these changes
come only very slowly).
35. For example, "Should I approve this hate speech rule which the administration of University X
has enacted and the ACLU has challenged? My brother Judge Y thinks -, but the case law seems to
hold -; moreover, there seem to be strong policy reasons in favor of -. Maybe I'll ask counsel what
he or she thinks."
36. Thus, for example, the judge's understanding of such terms as "insult" (mild or serious?),
"dignity," "fair," and "free," will affect, and almost predetermine, the outcome of a case implicating the
boundaries of the interpretive community. The judge's experiences with insult and invective, with black
people, with historical episodes such as the Hollywood blacklist, and so on, will all play a role in that
understanding.
37. See Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 813, 817-19
(1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Essay on Power] (describing the ways in which cultural power encodes
itself in the very meanings and pictures we use to communicate and understand social reality). In the

analogous context of the role of patriarchy in modem society, see generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEmINiSM UNMODIFIED: DiscoURsEs ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) [hereinafter MAcKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED]; CATHARIm A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989)
[hereinafter MAcKINNON, FEmINIsT THEoRY] (both detailing the way in which male power, or
patriarchy, affects everything we do and see).
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stand outside their own interpretive community. They must be unsituated,
have no experience, attach no particular meanings to words and arguments.
This is no easy task." History shows that when reformers have asked the
dominant society to restructure itself radically, the response has often been
incomprehension, if not ridicule. The would-be reformer is heard as urging
that black be redefined as white, night as day, a thing as its opposite. After
a brief review of such responses, we return to the question of why this
happens.
II
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN REFORMERS ASK Us TO CHANGE THE
EXISTING SPEECH-PARADIGM

At many points in human history, activists and innovators have asked
society to transform radically the way it thought and spoke about a subject
or group. Often the request was tantamount to a change in consciousness,
requiring the adoption of a new definition of the human community or community of concern, of the "we" in the "we are this." In most cases, this
request was greeted initially with skepticism and disbelief. This was so in
large part, we believe, because reformers were heard as asking for something that could not be said, or heard, within the current speech paradigm
and was therefore unthinkable. This limitation bodes ill for the cause of
persons advocating limitations on hate speech.
Consider, for example, society's responses to the early abolitionist
movement. For decades, the principal response was consternation and disbelief.39 Many whites, including some mainline church leaders, believed
blacks were inferior to whites, childlike, and ill prepared to assume the
responsibilities of citizenship. 40 Even President Pierce reacted to the prospect of abolition with shock and dismay. In a message to Congress, he
charged that granting blacks full rights was beyond lawful authority and
could only be accomplished by the "forcible disruption of a country" he
considered the best and most free in human history. 4 1 He charged the abolitionists with appealing to passion, prejudice, and hatred.42 To be sure, part
of the resistance to abolition was economic, especially in the South. But at
least as much was conceptual and stemmed from a failure of imagination or
empathy.
38. See Delgado & Stefancic, Norns and Narratives,supra note 1, at 1956-57; see also Powell,
Reconciling, supra note 1, at 24-28 (noting that the temptation is almost always to favor, or "privilege"
the view with which one is familiar); infra note 58-69 and accompanying text.
39. E.g., LEON F. LrrwACK, NORTH oF SLAVERY 12-14, 33, 106-09, 223-26 (1961) (detailing rise
of and responses to the early abolition movement).
40. Id. at 223-26.
41. President's Message to Congress, CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., app. 1, 1 (1857).
42. Id.
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Many citizens reacted to the abolitionist message with surprise or
scorn: What, free them? Early feminists43 and children's rights advocates" met similar resistance. More recently, environmentalists,45 gay and
lesbian activists,4 6 and animal rights advocates47 have encountered the same
reactions. In response to the first three movements mentioned, society
eventually changed its paradigm or way of thinking about the group in the
direction of greater inclusion. In the cases of animal rights and of gay and
lesbian rights, society will probably do so in the future. We think this contrast is general: proposals that entail a reconstitution of the human community or community of concern always spark much greater resistance than
ones that do not, such as a change in the way we finance schools. The
request that we change our speech and our thoughts with respect to minorities and women, we believe, taps much of the same resistance that accompanied previous broad social reforms. In the remainder of this Essay, we
explain in greater detail how this resistance arises, and suggest means by
which reformers may sometimes overcome or silence it.
III
MECHANISMS OF CULTURAL RESISTANCE, AND How TO
DOUBLE-CROSS THEM

We construct the social world, in large part, through speech.4" How
we speak to and of others determines whether and on what terms we accept
them into our world as groups and as individuals.4 9 The leaders of the
reform movements just mentioned were asking for more than better treatment in material respects for certain people or things. They were also ask43. For examples of early advocacy, see, e.g., THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF LrrERATuRE By
VOMEN 253, 344 (Sandra M. Gilbert & Susan Gubar eds., 1985) (address by Elizabeth Cady Stanton;
article by Stanton and Susan B. Anthony); Beverly A. Fish, Sojourner Truth: Crusaderfor Women's
Rights, in 2 BLACK WOMEN IN UNrrED STATES HISTORY 386, 390 (Darlene C. Hine ed., 1990).
44. On the early history of child labor and children's rights reform, see MARY JONES,
AUoBIOGRAPHY OF MOTHER JONES 71-83 (1925); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 260-61 (1980).
45. STEWART L. UDALL, THE QumT Cisism
AND THE NExT GENERATION 195-203, 209-10, 255-60

(1988).

46. RANDY SHILTs, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON (1987) (history of gay and lesbian activism and
society's responses in the context of the AIDS epidemic); Lynne Duke, Drawing Parallels-Gaysand
Blacks: Linking MilitaryBan to IntegrationFight Stirs Outrage, Sympathy, WASH. PoST, Feb. 13, 1993,
at Al.
47. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERAMTON (1975); William Ecenbarger, The Rights of Animals,
PHII.A. INQUMER, May 13, 1984, (Magazine), at 20, 22 (attributing increased acceptance and
respectability of the animal rights movement to publication in 1983 of philosopher Tom Regan's THE
CASE FOR ANIMAL RiGi-rs); Jon Margolis, Radical Protectorsof Animals are Wrong about Rights, Cm.
TRiE., Mar. 19, 1991, at C19.
48. See sources cited supra notes 9, 27.
49. See ERVING GOFF/dAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDF-NTTY, 2-8
(Touchstone 1986) (discussing generally the socially-constructed stigmatization of the ugly, deformed,
and racially different, and detailing individual responses and adaptations to that construction); Delgado,
Words that Wound, supra note 1.
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ing that these people or things be thought of, spoken of, constructed,
differently. 5" They were asking that terms like human, creature, decent,
good, nice, precious, and worthy of respect apply to them. In short, they
were asking for membership in the community. Respectful speech, even
more than willingness to rent a house or offer a job to someone, indicates
the degree to which we accept a person's humanity.5 1
Yet speech, including the reformer's, is paradigm-dependent; 52 unfortunately, both exclusion and inclusion are built into the very narratives and
thought structures by which we communicate. 53 Recent focus on our common language reveals that the "image of the outsider" in American law and
culture has always included a host of stories, pictures, and stock characters
that are demeaning, yet seldom seen as such at the time.54 During each era,
a few reformers complained of the unfairness of a Sambo, a Charlie Chan,
or a Tom image, but the usual response was incomprehension: isn't that the
way they actually are? 5 Our system of ethnic depiction constructs reality
so that the images seem true, or at most, are perceived as humorous exaggerations well within the bounds of artistic license.5 6
We coined the term empathicfallacy to describe the belief that we may
somehow escape the confines of our own internalized narratives, that we
may easily and endlessly reform ourselves and each other through argu57
ment, exhortation, exposure to great literature, and other verbal means. If
even modest alterations in our system of imagery, such as abandoning a
stereotype a group finds demeaning, provoke strong resistance, how much
more will we resist requests that appear to require radical restructuring of
our self-concept as a people? In proposing rules that change the way we
speak about women or persons of color, the reformer is heard as saying
something verging on incoherent. Later, when we realize what they are
saying, we are outraged. The reformer, we learn, is asking that us be
defined to include them, that justice means consideration of those others,
that "nice" refers to those we have learned are "not nice," those who were
excluded from the paradigm by which we first learned how to use that term.
50. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 37; Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1,at 1281-82
(on the usual fate that befalls reformers).
51. Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 1, at 136-43 (discussing the harms of racism to make
a case for reform of tort law to permit redress for racially hurtful remarks and slurs).
52. That is, communication presupposes a common store of meanings, intentions, understandings,
etc. See sources cited supra notes 9, 27-28.
53. See Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1275-84.
54. See id. at 1259-61, 1280.
55. See id. at 1278-82. In the analogous context of images of women, see Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic, Pornographyand Harm to Women: "No EmpiricalEvidence?", 53 Osno ST.L.J. 1037,
1039-42 (1992) (surveying history of stereotypical images of women in the United States) [hereinafter
Delgado & Stefancic, No Empirical Evidence].
56. See Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1260-61, 1275-79.
57.

Id. at 1261, 1280-82.
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Judges are no quicker than others to surmount their own limitations of
culture and experience." Incases containing a radical reform component,
even eminent justices often fail to appreciate the moral force of the new
vision being urged on them. Years later, such cases are labeled "anomalies," failures that mar the reputation of an otherwise great jurist.5 9
A judge is always free, within the limits of precedent, to modify the
current understanding of terms like justice, fairness, discrimination, and
equal protection. But given the limitations of the courtroom situation, that
modification could occur only through a process of dialogue among the
judge, the lawyers, and the relevant community. Such a dialogue is necessarily heavily weighted in favor of the status quo. Long ago, empowered
actors and speakers enshrined their meanings, preferences, and views of the
world into the common culture and language." Now, deliberation within
that language, purporting always to be neutral and fair, inexorably produces
results that reflect their interests.6 1
Only a judge with no experience, history, or community-virtually
with no language-could render an unbiased decision in a case calling for
reformulation of the terms by which we define that community, change our
history, alter our language. There is no such judge. Tools of thought primarily facilitate "normal science"-minor, incremental refinements in the
current structures by which we see and rule ourselves. Law is no exception.62 After its passage, even the Fourteenth Amendment was often used
to protect corporations and then later to rationalize a regime of segregation
in which blacks were "separate but equal." 63 Given these limitations, the
result of free speech, including speech in the courtroom, is most often to
ensure stasis, not to facilitate change.

58. Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives,supra note 1, at 1930, 1955 (arguing judges are
little better able than average people to escape current understandings of social reality).
59. Id. at 1934-52 (citing examples of judicial opinions written by eminent justices who misread
how history would later judge these opinions).
60. See Delgado, Essay on Power, supra note 37, at 818-19; see generally MICHEL FOUCAuLT,
PowER/KNOWLEDGE (1980) (describing the way social discourse inscribes and reinscribes power
relations through what we decide to call "knowledge"); MAcKIwNON. FEMINIsM UNMODMED, supra
note 37; MACKINNON, FEMImsr THEORY, supra note 37.
61. See, e.g., President's Message to Congress, supra note 41 (announcing that the State of the
Union address is the product of impartial assessment of the country's interests, and denouncing
abolitionism as an appeal to passion, prejudice, and hatred); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth
Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. Rv. 1133, 1139-47 (1993)
(explalning how neutral principles of constitutional law disadvantage minority groups). We suspect that
this observation is true beyond law - medical knowledge benefits doctors, military doctrine benefits
generals, and so on. Generally, knowledge benefits those who control it.
62. Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1278-84.
63. See BELT, RACE, RACISM, supra note 13, at 2-51 (providing historical illustrations of the
themes of American racism).
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Blacks, women, gays and lesbians, and others were not part of the
speech community that framed the Constitution and Bill of Rights.' 4 They
fell outside the original definition of "we the people"; they were not
allowed to speak. Later, when they did speak, their speech was deemed
incoherent, self-interested, worthy of scorn.65 Who would credit a member
of a group whose members are-according to thousands of images, plots,
narratives, stories, and songs-stupid, bestial, happy-go-lucky, and sexually
licentious?6 6 Words apportion credibility and define the community.6"
Because those assigned a stigma are thereby separated from mainstream
society,68 it is likely that few judges will know them. How many judges are
good friends with an African American, send their children to schools with
more than a token black presence, or attend social clubs where blacks or
Mexicans appear in roles other than those of gardener or waiter? Excluded
groups fall outside most judges' experience.6 9 Lacking experience, what
can they fall back upon other than what they hear and read?
Much of what they hear and read comes, of course, from the law, an
interpretive community of its own. At a recent annual meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, participants explored the question,
"Does the law have a canon?"70 Some answered no, the law has only cases,
statutes, administrative regulations, and the like, which are the same for
everyone, black or white, conservative or liberal.7"
But the law does have a canon. It consists of terms like "just," "fair,"
"equal," "equal opportunity," "unfair to innocent whites," "nice," "deserving," and "meritorious," all with canonical meanings that reflect our sense
of how things ought to be, namely much as they are.72 The terms reassure
64. Id. at 20-25; see also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QusT FOR

RACIAL JUSTICE 26-50 (1989) [hereinafter BELL, NOT SAVED] (discussing Constitutional Convention in
light of fictional conversation with "Geneva").
65. Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1270, 1282, 1287.
66. See id. at 1261-75 (chronicling stereotypical depictions of African Americans, Mexicans,
Native Americans, and Asians in popular culture).
67. Id. at 1286-87. On the way legal categories, headnotes, index numbers, and other research
tools limit and confine legal thought and imagination, see generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Why Do We Tell the Same Stories? Law Reform, CriticalLibrarianship,and the Triple Helix Dilemma,
42 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Triple Helix Dilemma].
68. See Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1270, 1286-87 (illustrating how ethnic
images alienate and diminish credibility and regard for members of minority groups).
69. For statistics on the demographic characteristics of recent Clinton appointees to the American
judiciary, see Naftali Bendavid, Diversity Marks Clinton Judiciary, RECORDER, Dec. 30, 1993, at I
(giving net worths and law school alma maters of 27 recent Clinton federal judiciary nominees, seven of
whom are worth more than one million dollars and only two of whom are worth less than $200,000); see
generally 1 & 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1992).
70. Ass'n of Amer. Law Schools, Friday,January 8, 1993, AALS PlenarySession, 1993 A.A.L.S.
PROC. 70.

71.

Conversation with a colleague, at AALS Annual Meeting, in San Francisco, California (Jan. 5,

1993) (commenting that there is no real legal canon, except cases, statutes, and other documents, and

that these are equally accessible to all).
72. On the homeostatic, status quo-maintaining function of legal terms, see Delgado & Stefancic,
Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 67, at 213, 215-22 (discussing the way legal categories, contained in
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us that all is well, that our own situations in life are deserved (because fairly
won), and that change generally ought to be resisted because the demand
for change is incoherent or unprincipled.7 3 Many years ago, the majority of
us learned what "principled" means, and it certainly doesn't mean the
strange thing that reformer is saying! Words, once they enter the canon,
freeze community, enabling us to resist transformation without even noticing how we do so. The suggestion that they are like us is heard as an
impossibility.74
Thus, when a reformer demands that we look at things in a different
way, our first response is outrage or incredulity: what they are asking for
simply does not fit our paradigm. But if the reformer persists, we are apt to
deploy a series of mechanisms to discredit them and what they are saying.
These mechanisms are outlined below.
A.

General Mechanisms We Deploy to Derail Our Own Reformist
Impulses

Any serious proposal to transform society radically is apt to provoke a
number of predictable responses, particularly when the proposal threatens
self-interest.7 5 We can fail to hear what the reformer is saying, or translate
the message into something else. We can declare that the reformer is obviously aiming to avert a particular evil, and then pretend not to find any
evidence that the evil is in fact occurring. We can deprecate the reformer as
extreme, politically motivated, self-interested, or bizarre.76
Running through most of these mechanisms of resistance is the idea
that the reformer is imposing on the status quo. 7 7 Since some whites find it
normal and acceptable to depict African Americans and other people of
terms, meanings, and conventional research tools, confine what may be said or imagined). See also
Delgado, Essay on Power, supranote 37, at 822-24. On our society's system of racial imagery and its
contribution to maintaining power relations, see Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1259-60.
For an example of the pervasiveness of racial thinking, see PATRICIA Wnmi.As, ALCHwMY OF RACE AND
RioTrrs: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 44-51 (1991).
73. On this legitimation function, see Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
through AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINr. L. REv. 1049,
1054-55 (1978).
74. Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1282-84 (discussing the resistance that greets
most reform efforts); see also Delgado & Stefancic, No EmpiricalEvidence, supra note 55, at 1046-54
(discussing resistance to reform in connection with pornography).
75. See Delgado & Stefancic, No EmpiricalEvidence, supra note 55, at 1046-54. For evidence
that change is unlikely when the reformer's goals are contrary to those of the majority, see Derrick Bell,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. Rv. 518, 524
(1980) [hereinafter Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma] (arguing that desegregation occurred only
when it had become advantageous for elite whites).
76. For an earlier discussion of each of these mechanisms in the context of proposals to regulate
pornography, see Delgado & Stefancic, No Empirical Evidence, supra note 55, at 1046-52.
77. Designating the reformist group as encroaching on our rights denies them legitimacy and
gives us the moral standing to be indignant and to reject their program. We call this the notion of
imposition, See RICHARD DEaLGo & JEAN Sa'mAN cIc, FAILED RvoLtuoNs ch. 9 (forthcoming
1994).
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color as inferior, the suggestion that this be changed strikes them as aggressive, as an encroachment. Civil rights are fine, up to a point. But with each
successive demand, the reformers are decried as having exceeded all reasonable bounds. "We have already admitted some of them into the workplace, made places for them at our schools. Now they want to control how
we speak, how we think. They are going too far." No longer victims,
minorities become the aggressors and the majority the innocent victim.
Resistance by the majority is not only morally permissible, it is
appropriate.7 8
The point of canonical ideas is to resist attack. "9 If one places at the
center of one's belief system the notion that all language should be free and
that equality must accommodate itself to that regime, then all equality arguments but the most moderate will appear extreme and unjust, constrained as
they are by our canonical language. The canon defines the starting point,
the baseline from which we decide what other messages, ideas, concepts,
and proposals are acceptable. Only moderate messages that effect minor
incremental refinements within the current regime pass the test. 80 All
preconceptions-that women's place is with home and children, that minorities are here at our sufferance, that we have given blacks too much already,
that speech ought to be free regardless of its cost-resist change. Reason
and argument are apt to prove unavailing; the point of the canon is to define
what is a reasoned, just, principled demand. Because hate speech rules fall
outside this boundary, if one begins (as we do) with a free speech paradigm,
reason fails and the status quo prevails.
B. Strategiesfor the Outsider
Even though reform proposals predictably evoke stubborn resistance,
history shows that there are a number of means by which reformers can
nevertheless bring about change. These include rearranging interest convergence, tricking the trope, and the narrative strategy of the double cross.
Each of these tools is potentially available to reformers who wish to institute hate speech rules.
1. RearrangingInterest Convergence
Societies rarely restructure themselves in response to a reasoned plea,
but they do readily change in response to changes in material conditions. 81
For example, the American workplace quickly accepted women once the
78. Id.
79. Stanley Fish, Professor of Law and English, Duke University, Address to the AALS Plenary
Panel, San Francisco, California (Jan. 5. 1993). For a broader perspective on the general cultural canon
in the United States, see generally HmRY Louis GATES, JR., LoosE CANONS: NOTS ON TE CuLTuRa
WARS (1992) (examining the impact of multiculturalism, nationalism, and the politics of identity on

American society, education, and culture).
80.
81.

See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 75, at 523-24.
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slipping economic position of the United States plus the advent of information technology made women's entry both necessary and feasible.8 2
Reformers on behalf of women's rights had been advocating the virtues of
equality in the workplace for centuries, while making little headway.83
Once the nation became persuaded that its economic well-being required
women in the workplace, change quickly followed. Derrick Bell interprets
the tortuous course of civil rights progress in similar fashion: black people
have made progress only when, and to the extent that, the progress also
benefited members of the majority group.8 4 The same is probably true for
other disadvantaged groups, such as inmates of mental facilities, children,
and the aged.8 5
How will interest convergence bear on the fortunes of hate speech
reformers? Municipal and collegiate hate speech regulations do little to
advance the tangible self-interest of powerful whites. At one time, the
United States was engaged in competition with the Soviet Union for the
loyalties of the uncommitted Third World, most of which is black, Asian, or
brown. During this period, it behooved us to be on our best behavior
toward our own minority populations. We could scarcely portray ourselves
as superior to godless Communism all the while visibly mistreating our own
populations of color.86 Moderate reforms were enacted; the Supreme Court
even upheld a group libel law in a single case.8 7 With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the need for such exemplary behavior has today largely disappeared. Blacks are a relatively weak group, while the forces arrayed
against them in the hate speech controversy are well financed, certain they
are right, and able to command the legal expertise to bring and win test
suits. 8 Today, interest convergence is not a particularly promising avenue
for blacks and others interested in promoting the cause of hate speech regulation. We believe a certain amount of unanswered, low-grade racism and
82. Cf. Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, The Politicsof Workplace Reforms: Recent Works on
Parental Leave and a Father-DaughterDialogue, 40 RuTGERS L. REv. 1031, 1034-35 (1988)
(discussing the pragmatist view which is concerned less with equality and more with the fact that
women with children are needed in the workforce).
83. For a history of women in the workplace, see generally AMERICA'S WORINO WOMEN
(Rosalyn Baxandall et al. eds., 1976).
84. Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 75, at 523; see generally BELL, RACE,
RACISM, supra note 13 (economic determinist view of racial progress).
85. For example, it seems plausible that society began to take the rights of the mentally ill
seriously when cures became possible and hospitalization costly, and that children's rights acquired
urgency only when society began to need a reliable supply of healthy, well-educated workers for an
industrial-technological economy.
86. For exposition of this hypothesis in connection with the "breakthrough" case of Brown v.
Board of Education, see Bell, Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, supra note 75, at 524. For a more recent
treatment confirming this hypothesis, see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,

41

STAN.

L. REv. 61, 62-63 (1988).

87. Beauharnals v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
88. The most effective opponent of hate speech regulation is the ACLU. See, e.g., Marjorie
Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words that Wound," 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 585 (1983)
(authored by an ACLU Staff Attorney); Strossen, Regulating, supra note 21, at 489, 552-54.
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hassling on the nation's campuses may even confer a benefit on the status
quo. 89
2.

"Tricking the Trope": Employing Verbal Ju-jitsu

In the absence of interest convergence, reformers may employ other
avenues for achieving redress. The first we call tricking the trope. One can
identify and enumerate the rhetorical strategies the dominant culture
deploys to deny one moral legitimacy, and to portray one as extreme, as an
aggressor, as interested in trammelling others' rights, and so on. Then one
can proceed to turn these rhetorical strategies against the dominators.
Martin Luther King, Jr. was an expert at this strategy. Innumerable
times he brought the lofty language of the Declaration of Independence, the
Bible, and other basic cultural documents to bear in the cause of racial justice for blacks.9" This sometimes stopped Southern racists in their trackstheir own rhetoric and beliefs were being used against them. King's most
effective speeches and letters thus were replete with references to Moses
leading the people out of bondage and to the political rights of all men, and
reminded us of this nation's commitment to brotherhood and equality for
all.91
. In the hate speech controversy, reformers might remind their opponents that our founding as a nation grew out of complaints over disrespectful treatment and petty annoyances at the hands of the British aristocracy,
that the Pledge of Allegiance ends with the words, "With liberty and justice
for all", and that, more recently, the Third Reich prepared the way for atrocities visited on Jews, Gypsies, and homosexuals by first stigmatizing them
and portraying them as less than human.9 2 The powerful rhetoric of the
ACLU and other organizations committed to expanding free speech can be
turned around. Why do black undergraduates not have an equal right to go
where they please without harassment and personal assault? Perhaps it is
the defenders of First Amendment orthodoxy who are the aggressors, after
all.
89. See Delgado, Narratives,supra note 1, at 380 n.319 (arguing that low-grade hassling bencfits
white-dominated institutions by keeping minorities on the defensive, preventing them from mobilizing
around more costly reform measures, and assuring that students of color with spirit leave the institution).
90. For a comprehensive treatment of King's transformative rhetoric, see generally Anthony
Cook, Beyond CriticalLegal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr.Martin Luther King, Jr., 103
HARv. L. REv. 985 (1990).
91. Id. at 1013, 1023-41 (analyzing King's theology and rhetoric); see also MARTIn LuTHPR
KING, JR., I HAVE A DE.mM: WRrNGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (James Washington
ed., 1992).
92. On the "functional" role that racial and other forms of stereotypes play in allowing the
exploitation of those who are stereotyped, see Delgado and Stefancic, Images, supra note 1, at 1275-76.
On the way this process operated in pre-war Germany, see WILLiAM L. SmRIER, THE RISE AND FALL or
THE TtmRD REICH 231-76 (1960).
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Double-Crossingthe Narrative: The Role of the Counterstory

A third strategy that can be deployed is the double-cross or "trickster"
tale. In black history, oral storytellers and then black novelists and poets
have used the double-cross to register their disagreement with a regime that
oppressed and demeaned them at every turn.9 3 The Spanish picaro was a
similar figure. The trickster was one who employed slyness and clever
strategy to win justice from a more powerful master; the double-cross was,
similarly, a means to avenge unfair treatment.94
Currently, a new generation of civil rights scholars, known as critical
race theorists, is developing a form of legal scholarship which uses narratives or storytelling. Writers who adopt this approach employ anecdotes,
chronicles, dialogues, and similar tales to analyze, criticize, and expose
mindset.95 Some such accounts take the form of stories from personal
experience, illustrating a point about racial justice. 96 Others take a different
approach. Instead of aiming at bringing to life the minority perspective or
experience, these accounts focus on some majoritarian narrative, for example the notion of the innocent white male, or that racial discrimination does
not exist unless it is intentional, or that role modeling is a good idea. 97
These "counterstories" are aimed at displacing one or more of these comforting majoritarian myths and tales in order to call into question the accuracy, impartiality, and correctness of the current story or account of
progress toward racial equality. Derrick Bell's "Geneva Chronicles" are
prime examples, 98 but there are many more. 99
Could storytellers of color or their sympathizers employ these tools to
shake the complacency of the forces resisting hate speech rules? Perhaps
so. Irony, the demonstration of how self-interest operates in the current
regime, and the "flip," the change of frame or perspective, are powerful
93. On the present-day use of the counterstory and its roots in trickster tales and picaresque
humor, see generally Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others: A Pleafor Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2411-15 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado, Oppositionists].
94. Id. at 2414. For a recent example, see Kendall Thomas, A House Divided Against Itself: A
Comment on "Mastery, Slavery, and Emancipation," 10 CARDoZO L. Rev. 1481 (1989) (attempting to
double-cross Hegel's construct of the Master/Slave relationship, inspired by African American trickster
tales).
95. See generally Delgado, Oppositionists supra note 93 (discussing the emerging narrative
approach to legal scholarship); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971
(1991). For criticism of this approach, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993).
96. See, e.g., WILLiAMs, supra note 72, at 44-45 (Patricia Williams' famous "Benetton" story).
97. See, e.g., Delgado, Oppositionists, supra note 93, at 2418-35 (offering five versions of the
same incident in which a black applicant interviews for a teaching position at a major law school and is
rejected); see also BELL, Nor SAVED, supra note 64 (containing ten "Chronicles," each aimed at
exposing some myth or comforting story about racial progress).
98. See BELL, NOT SAVED, supra note 64; DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTrOM OF THE WELL
(1992); Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1985).
99.

See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, CriticalRace Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79

VA. L. REv. 461 (1993) (describing Critical Race thought in general, and annotating over 200 articles,
many of which are counterstories).
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means of introducing doubt or "suspicion" where they did not exist before.
Minority storytellers have already begun the task of deploying such tools.
4.

Cultural Nationalism and Renewal

Each of the preceding approaches-interest convergence and the two
narrative strategies-presupposes that the insurrectionist group wishes to
merge with the dominant society, but merely on more favorable terms. A
fourth strategy consists of withdrawal, either permanent or strategic. The
trend toward cultural nationalism among Chicano and African American
groups is a recent example." °
In the controversy about hate speech, we see the beginnings of such an
approach. Parents of minority children, concerned about their well-being
and safety at white-dominated institutions, are beginning to send their college-age offspring to predominantly black schools, such as Howard and
Morehouse, where the atmosphere will be more supportive. This strategy
has the advantages of avoiding the need for hate speech rules altogether,
building black institutions and culture, and allowing the next generation of
African American leaders to develop in relative safety.
It is ironic that the threat of black flight may prove the spur that college and university administrators need to begin the serious process of
assessing their own institutional cultures and environments. The University
of Wisconsin, for example, enacted a speech code precisely at a point when
concern over a diminishing black presence on the state's campuses had
reached real alarm. 10 1 The very act of pointing out the onset of defensive
nationalism and the consequences it may have for campuses committed to
educating tomorrow's leaders may supply a vital (because self-interest
based) argument for reform.
CONCLUSION

We have argued that speech and equality, freedom of expression and
the call for community, both presuppose and threaten each other. Speech,
at least in the grand dialogic sense, presupposes rough equality among the
speakers, while equality depends on activism and mass action, both of
which are unthinkable without speech. Insult and invective by a powerful
majority, however, can oppress a minority. Likewise, imposition of a dominant community's values and beliefs can stifle speech and thought.
Efforts to balance these competing values fall because they ignore the
way the two are inextricably interdependent aspects of a more basic struc100. On the cultural-nationalist strain in recent race scholarship, see id. at 463; Gary Peller, Race
Consciousness, 1990 Dura LJ. 758.
101. Author Richard Delgado was one of three University of Wisconsin-Madison professors who

participated in drafting the University of Wisconsin speech code. On that campus, declining minority
enrollment was a motivating factor for the adoption of a speech code. On the rise of campus codes in
response to felt needs, see Delgado, Narratives,supra note 1, at 349-58.
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ture-the interpretive community. Judges asked to strike a balance
between free speech and minority protection are in effect deciding the contours of a new interpretive community. They must decide whose views
count, whose speech is to be taken seriously, whose humanity afforded full
respect. Can they do so fairly and open-mindedly given that most of them
come from the dominant speech community? We have our doubts.
In Part II, we called attention to reform movements whose members
asked society to transform radically the way it thought or spoke about a
subject or group. Their proposals were greeted initially with skepticism and
disbelief because the messages were heard as asking the unthinkable
according to the communicative paradigm of the time. In Part III, we
showed why this is so. Social decisionmakers asked to make decisions in
favor of one interpretive community over another are situated in a speech
paradigm. Their deliberations are carried out through words already carrying established meanings, almost always heavily weighted in favor of the
status quo. Thus, reformers provoke predictable responses in society at
large. We either fall to hear their message, or mistranslate it when we do.
We misdirect the point of their critique, then fail to find evidence of social
ill. We deprecate their intent or declare that we are the ones suffering
imposition.
Hate speech reform invokes a plausible constitutional paradigm, with
its own history, case law, and genuine heroes. Yet prospects for change are
not particularly good. Because of the way we are situated and because there
is little in the self-interest of elite groups to cause them to want change,
reform of laws against hate speech is certain to continue to evoke sharp
resistance. At some future time, the United States will probably join the
majority of Western nations that impose limitations on racial incitement and
invective. We will then look back on our current stance and wonder how
we could have thought it "principled."

